Greg Knight: Does the Minister accept, however, that this is not just a question of access at stations? Many disabled people find travelling by train far too daunting because of poor lighting, inadequate service announcements and the lack of a handrail where one should be provided. Will she do her best to see that those matters are addressed with a sense of urgency? I understand that the Joint Committee on Mobility of Blind and Partially Sighted People asked many months ago for a meeting between itself, other key parties and the Minister of State, Department for Transport. When will that meeting take place?

Andrew Robathan: That shows how effective acoustic barriers close to the motorway can be. I hope that the Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State have received a petition, containing nearly 700 names, from people who live in Narborough and Enderby in my constituency, whose lives are made a misery by the noise from the M1. Will the Under-Secretary—and preferably the Secretary of State, too—visit my constituents in Narborough and Enderby to hear the unbelievable noise in their houses and their gardens? Will he pledge to come before the end of the financial year, so that money can be made available in the next financial year to erect acoustic barriers when the motorway is resurfaced so that my constituents' lives can be improved, as has happened in Luton? What is good for Luton is good for Leicestershire—

John Thurso: Is the Secretary of State aware of the encouraging trend reported in the Strategic Rail Authority's latest "National Rail Trends" document, which shows an overall increase of about 11 per cent. in rail freight during the last reported quarter? Is he concerned, however, about the fact that such increase is almost entirely in bulk commodity and actually masks a drop of 12.7 per cent. in other freight? Does he agree that such demand would be best served by the creation of freight villages or rail freight interchanges, and what will the Government do to encourage such development?

David Jamieson: The Highways Agency and the Strategic Rail Authority have been commissioned to examine capacity issues on the Dartford crossing and the level of demand for a rail crossing. They are due to report to the Secretary of State in the coming months. The further steps required to address capacity on this strategic route will be determined in light of those reports.

Clause 20
	 — 
	The Supreme Court

Dominic Grieve: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, who represents a seat which historically formed part of Middlesex and still does. If one goes into the building, one notices that it is redolent with civic pride relating to the county of Middlesex. There are coats of arms associated with the county and a host of carving that highlights the traditions of the county, all of which have been easily adapted to the environment of a Crown court. Historically, many Crown courts have sat in shire halls in the same way as takes place in Middlesex guildhall. It is a perfect environment for a Crown court, but we are setting up the supreme court of the United Kingdom. Either we must take out the stained glass, remove the carving and alter the interiors so that they correspond to the idea that the new members of the supreme court who are enthusiastic about it have about their functions, or we are putting them into a building that is the very opposite of what they wanted.
	It is a matter of slight speculation, but one can draw some inferences from what Lord Bingham said as to what those Law Lords who are in favour of turning themselves into a supreme court want. My impression is that they want a building that is distinguished in appearance, probably modern if it could be found—[Interruption.] Well, a number of buildings have been floated as proposals ranging from Somerset house to Middlesex Guildhall, and in each case, I have detected objections, both from public utterances and from what I have picked up in other circumstances, to the effect that none of them quite reflects the image of the court that they want to put forward. I have some sympathy with that. It is clear that they want the Committee Room-appearance of the courtroom, with the judges not on the dais but down at the same level as the practitioners, to be preserved. In an ideal world, they would want some facilities for the public so that the place is user-friendly to those coming in and to suggest something accessible, informal and modern, and even some sort of interpretation centre—I do not mean that in any way pejoratively—to give people an impression of what the new court will do. I have great difficulty imagining all those things in the context of the setting of Middlesex guildhall, and so does Lord Bingham.

Simon Hughes: I smile at the idea that the Conservative party is resisting a change of use to Middlesex guildhall when I seem to remember that it was responsible for a change of use to County hall over the river into something far further removed from civic pride than is being suggested for the guildhall. There may be good reasons for suggesting the fuildhall. If the hon. Gentleman does not want it to be the guildhall, but if we are to have a supreme court outside the Palace, will he tell us where he suggests that it should go?

Dominic Grieve: I entirely disagree. To begin with, there will be knock-on costs because the courts that currently sit in Middlesex guildhall will have to be found alternative accommodation. They are very busy Crown courts, and have been ever since they were set up. My fundamental point is that although Middlesex guildhall is a lovely building, there is no comparison, in terms of status, between it and this building. The only similarity lies in its Gothic revival historicity. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Nevertheless, it would be clear to anyone entering it that the Law Lords are occupying an old shire hall—albeit rather tastefully designed—of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is not adequate for a supreme court. I would much prefer to leave the Law Lords down at the other end of the Corridor. Anybody who sees the unusually informal way in which they operate there would be completely comfortable with the idea of their continuing to do so. We are going to waste money on something that will be unnecessary even if a supreme court is set up.
	Amendment No. 328 and the long list of consequential amendments that flow from it would radically alter the Bill. They return to a lengthy debate in the other place about whether we need a supreme court at all and whether it would be possible to preserve the existing structure of the Law Lords. The Law Lords themselves appear to be fairly evenly divided. Given the pressure for this move that the Government have exercised in the public sphere, it is remarkable that they have not succeeded in securing more than 50 per cent. support for it from the Law Lords. The truth is that the Law Lords function very well, as the Government repeatedly acknowledge, and that the Government's desire to get rid of the Appellate Committee is a piece of theoretical mumbo-jumbo that is completely unnecessary in practical terms.
	We are told that a separation of powers is required to send out this great signal that the judiciary is free of the Executive and Parliament. However, I worry much more about the signs of frequent interference in the independence of the judiciary by the previous Home Secretary than about where they sit and whether they are Members of the House of Lords. Judges have to exercise self-restraint in everything they do, to the extent of their private conversations at dinner parties, because in an age of mass publicity something that they have said, or has been said about them, could be seen to undermine the impartiality with which they discharge their office. They have succeeded in doing that, year in, year out—it has been impossible to find examples of where they have not. Where there has been any statement by a Law Lord or any other judge that might interfere with their ability to deal with a case, the general rule has been that they have not sat on it. The one exception is that of Lord Hoffman's involvement in the Pinochet case. However, the exception proves the rule, and that might equally well have applied had there been a supreme court. The fact that they are Law Lords makes no difference at all.
	The Government seem to think that Law Lords are put into a peculiarly delicate position because they should not be able to listen to, participate in and vote on debates in the House of Lords. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, in terms of voting they are extremely circumspect, virtually to the point of self-denying ordinance. Convention absolutely underpins the quality of our administration in this country. One of the things that worries me most about this Government is their absolute hatred of convention. They showed long ago that they could not be trusted to respect any convention in the book whatsoever. We had enough difficulty in persuading them to observe the convention of taking this Bill on the Floor of the House.
	The Government want to create a whole series of mechanistic structures that are designed to ensure the Law Lords' apparent independence but will not make a blind bit of difference to the way in which the public perceive their work. I believe that we will lose out in two ways. First, their participation in the legislature is rather a good thing. The opportunity for them to express, as they always do in a very careful and moderated way, any doubt or anxiety that they have about a piece of legislation that might, for instance, undermine the rule of law, sends a powerful signal to Government that they should think very carefully about what they are doing. That is an intensely useful structure in a parliamentary democracy.
	Secondly, the Law Lords have an opportunity to be receptive to what other people are saying. I do not want to suggest that judges are isolated, because they are not. The majority of the judiciary, outside of the Law Lords, operate in a world where they come into frequent contact with large numbers of people. For instance, the lives of those in the High Court are centred around the law courts in the Strand, which gives them a continuing connection with members of their own profession that they tend to find very useful. However, the Law Lords, by virtue of being here, have never had that contact in the same way. My impression, from conversations, is that they value working in a building with other people whose sole focus is not the law. They value the opportunities that that provides for gaining understanding from, for example, attending meetings about issues of public concern. That gives them an important focus, which helps them in their judicial work.
	Yet all that will be blown away, first by getting rid of their status as Law Lords and secondly, by moving them out of the building. Some of the ethos could probably be preserved by creating the supreme court but leaving its members in the building to enjoy its facilities. Again, that would be cheap but we would lose something by removing their right to sit and debate. There is a way round that. I agree that we need an appointments mechanism for the supreme court. The majority of the amendments that the Opposition tabled try to preserve the structure while enabling the Law Lords to remain in the House of Lords.
	The second issue that we need to consider is the position in respect of Law Lords being made life peers. New clause 7 is a probing amendment on that. At what stage would that happen? Would they be made life peers when they cease to sit as members of the supreme court? Could they be made life peers while they are sitting? Could the president, but not the other members, be made a life peer? We need some clarification from the Government about those matters.
	As I understand it, it is not intended that the Lord Chief Justice should cease to be a peer but perhaps the Government intend that to happen. That must follow if we are moving towards a total separation of powers. I hope that we can engage with that in debate. [Interruption.] I hear the Under-Secretary saying, "suspended". That highlights the Government's approach: one can be a life peer but one cannot sit while serving as a judge. That is bizarre. What if someone who has been a life peer is appointed as a judge? That person will have engaged in public debate, yet is viewed as suitable to act as a judge. That underlines why the Government's attempt to produce clarity creates nothing but a silly mess.
	I wish that the Government would reconsider their obsession with the separation of powers, which, as I have often said, derives from poor old Montesquieu's failure to understand how the English judiciary worked in the 18th century. The discovery that the judiciary was not an arm of the Executive amazed him with delight when he came to England. However, he built that up into the separation of powers, which is different from judicial independence.
	I have outlined the reasons for the amendments and I hope that we will have an opportunity to consider the two issues carefully. I want to emphasise again that they are distinct. The issue of where the court should sit would apply if there were a supreme court. One could continue with the Law Lords and move them into another building—there is no reason why one could not do that. Amendment No. 350 therefore concentrates on location. I am anxious about the possibility that we may wait a long time before the sunrise clause comes into operation, unless the Government have made a clear decision about the Middlesex guildhall. The Under-Secretary will help us with that.
	The wider issue is the Government's monumental waste of public money, in which they specialise. The first example of that is the dome. It is interesting to note that the Lord Chancellor was associated with that, although he treated it as a rather difficult client for whom he had no personal responsibility. The second example is the Scottish Parliament building, which was started before the powers had been transferred to Edinburgh. I suspect that we are moving towards more major Government expenditure to achieve a result that could be obtained by continuing to spend overheads of £168,000 per annum. I do not understand where good government lies in that and I look forward to the Under-Secretary's response.

Ross Cranston: The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) began with the location of the court. He rightly said that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords currently operates in a seminar style. I have appeared before the House on several occasions and my experience is of academic, to quote the hon. Gentleman, discussion. It is the sort of discussion that needs close interaction and a dialogue between counsel and the members of the Judicial Committee. There is nothing inconsistent between that style of judicial decision making and a new location.
	To broaden the perspective, if one considers the operation of comparable courts such as the supreme courts of Canada or Australia, one see that style in a separate supreme court building or its equivalent. The Law Lords who support the change and the Government's proposals do not believe that the current style of decision making is inconsistent with having a different location.
	The hon. Gentleman mentioned Westminster Guildhall. I have sat there several times as a recorder and there is no doubt that structural changes must occur if the seminar style is to continue. That will require substantial expenditure. However, that is a consequence of the principle. That court has built up good relations with other parts of the criminal justice system in central London and I should like assurances from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary that everything will be done to facilitate transition for the judges and staff of that court and for the continuation of the good relations. I therefore have no problem with a move to a separate building or with Westminster Guildhall. Situated on Parliament square, it is an appropriate place for a supreme court.
	The more substantial point is the creation of the supreme court. As I said on Second Reading, I was initially sceptical about the proposal. There is no doubt that the House of Lords is an outstanding body. The judges are of the highest integrity and standing not only in common law but more generally in the international legal world. When one hears from judges such as Lord Nicholls, who opposes the change, that gives one pause for thought. We heard evidence before the Constitutional Affairs Committee from Lord Hope, the former Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland and now a member of the Judicial Committee, who said that he appreciated the opportunity to sit in the House of Lords in its legislative capacity, listen to debates and hear the issues of the day discussed. He believed that that was beneficial in the performance of his judicial functions. It gave him a wider perspective. There is no doubt that judges at that level need a wider perspective because they make decisions that have profound social consequences. However, as I also said on Second Reading, I am persuaded that the case for a supreme court has been made. I mentioned other jurisdictions. No other jurisdiction has our arrangement. Although that is not necessarily conclusive, it is a persuasive argument for change.
	I mentioned the supreme courts of Canada and Australia in the common law world. The Indian supreme court is also an eminent judicial body. Across the North sea in Germany, arrangements at the highest levels are different, in that there are supreme courts in functional areas such as tax, labour and administration. However, in Karlsruhe, we find the Bundesfassungsgericht—the German constitutional court—and the supreme court of justice, the Bundesgerichtshof. We have only to read the judgments of those courts to see why the Bundesfassungsgericht is so highly regarded as a constitutional court. Those are examples using comparisons. Other countries have supreme courts, so why do not we?
	The argument relating to the rule of law is strong. It is not an argument about the separation of powers, but, as Lord Bingham has said, judges are judges. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield asked why we needed a supreme court. Bagehot talked about the effective parts of the constitution, but he also talked about its symbolic aspects. Sometimes, as in this case, symbols are important. Here we would have a separate supreme court illustrating the fact that judges are functionally separate and that judges do judging.
	Let us look at the historical situation. The hon. Gentleman rightly said that we had had courts in this location for centuries. Furthermore, members of the Judicial Committee have also been members of the legislative body in the House of Lords, but those were different times. When we had our debate in Westminster Hall on the Constitutional Affairs Committee report, I quoted the words of Lord Salisbury on the kind of person who ought to be a judge. He also said that the judges in the House of Lords should be Members of the House of Lords,
	"since, practically, they have often to make law as judges, they will do it all the better for having also to make it as legislators".
	Frankly, I do not think that that argument holds water any more. I accept the point that judges make law. We lawyers all know that Lord Reid famously said that it was a fairy tale that judges did not make law. They do, but, more importantly, they make law within a social and economic context. In a case before the Privy Council in 1949, Lord Porter said:
	"The problem to be solved"—
	by the court—
	"will often be not so much legal as political, social and economic."
	Judges make important decisions that have social ramifications.
	The fact that we now have the Human Rights Act 1998, that we are getting important decisions such as the Belmarsh decision, and that, in a different context, we have had cases such as the Pinochet case, illustrates that judges are now making decisions that have a much greater impact on our social lives, both in terms of public perception and of reality.

Peter Bottomley: The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) advertised his speech as a short one, but it ran to 19 minutes; mine will be shorter than that. The first question to ask is why we are paying the price of a ministerial brainstorm that occurred during a botched reshuffle. Abolishing the Lord Chancellor and the issues arising from that proposal have resulted in a Bill of 227 pages. The major associated cost—[Interruption.] I do not intend to be interrupted too much by the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary. The major associated cost is the capital cost, but there are also high recurring costs.
	When the Law Lords appeared before the Constitutional Affairs Committee—I am very grateful to them and to the Lord Chancellor for doing so reasonably frequently—Lord Bingham said that the current arrangements passed the Bingham "pudding test", but not Bingham; in other words, appearances seem to be more important than anything else. If the issue is separating the place where the highest court will sit from the Palace of Westminster, I should point out that in doing so we would be separating it from the legislature, not the Government. I was intrigued by the idea, as advanced by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), of locating the court in a Government office. It would be far better to locate it in the legislature instead, but perhaps we can sort out that difference of opinion later.
	We could say that the Lord Chancellor's house need not be used by the Lord Chancellor. It could be defined as being outside Parliament, but still fall within the Palace of Westminster security screen. As a result, there would be no additional costs. In other words, we could deal with the situation by changing people's perception and altering the definition, in that same way that—as has been suggested—we could change the name from Lords of Appeal Ordinary to supreme court justices.
	The Government seem not to understand the difference between continuity and improvement and change. They have shown a lack of respect for an institution that has worked pretty well and they are obsessed with constant change. As a constituent of mine wisely said, if they were half as good at delivering results economically and effectively as they are at launching their ideas, life would be likely to improve. Not a single improvement will follow the high cost, disruption, argument and delay in which the Government's proposal will result. A far better idea would be to say that we prefer that the Law Lords do not vote in the upper House. That could be done by convention and, through a minor adaptation, we could establish that the Lord Chancellor need not sit on cases. The third problem could be solved by defining the place where the Law Lords meet as theoretically outside the Palace of Westminster. The only remaining issue would then be the best way of appointing the judges—an issue with which different clauses deal.
	I hope that the Committee will forgive me but I will have to leave the Chamber at 2 o'clock because the Constitutional Affairs Committee, which has contributed to this debate, will be in session and it needs to be quorate.

Christopher Leslie: It has been interesting to hear the debate so far, not least because the arguments both for and against have been put forward so well by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) and by the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) and for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler). I agree with many of the points that those Members advocated, though my reading of the amendments before us is rather different from that of Conservative Members, particularly regarding the entire deletion of the creation of a supreme court in one form or another. I accept some of the points made about particular aspects of the building, appointments to the supreme court and so forth, and I shall try to deal with them in turn.
	At present, the highest Court of Appeal in the land sits as a Committee of Parliament—the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. To anyone except a seasoned observer, it can appear that a legislative body is interpreting legislation. The status quo thus has potential flaws that could cause difficulties. About half of the present Law Lords are now reported to be uncomfortable with their position in the legislature, which potentially conflicts with their judicial role. They have had to exercise a self-denying ordinance in recent years in order to avoid speaking or voting on legislation that might later prejudice their objective application of those laws.
	Although the present system works, the time has now come to make improvements. Part 3 of the Bill, from clause 20 onwards, therefore proposes the creation of a new supreme court for the United Kingdom that is separate from Parliament, removing the potential conflict between the legislative and judicial roles of our most senior judges, and providing greater clarity and visible independence for our highest court.
	Ideally, the functional separation of the judiciary from the legislature and the Executive is a cardinal feature of any modern, liberal and democratic state that is governed by the rule of law. Pragmatically, the business of justice should be, and should be seen to be, independent of the business of Government and the business of Parliament. That was argued strongly by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. The interpretation and application of laws should not be undertaken by those intimately involved in making the laws. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has welcomed the proposal because it reduces the prospect of a critical judgment in the future that a free and fair tribunal should not be prejudiced by preconceived potential bias. Greater clarity is necessary for public confidence and for our continued reputation in the wider world.
	Specifically on the comments by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the location and nature of the prospective building, we believe that a new supreme court must be established in an acceptable way, in a manner fitting to the principles of the highest court in the land and the dignity commensurate to its status, while simultaneously securing value for money for the taxpayer.The Bill places the Lord Chancellor under a duty to provide appropriate accommodation and facilities—and here the sunrise clause 120 additionally ensures that commencement will not occur until those facilities are available. I am glad that the Select Committee commented favourably on those arrangements—in particular on page 20 of its report. To explain a little further, the arrangements were made in order to placate some of the concerns expressed in the other place—that there might be a hasty removal or eviction of the Law Lords from the House of Lords to somewhere they regarded as unsuitable. Ministers will approve the new building and ensure that consultation with the Law Lords takes place throughout the process until they become supreme court justices.
	The Government announced in December—I believe on either 14 or 19 December and in a written ministerial statement—the preferred option of Middlesex guildhall, the Crown court that we now see on the opposite side of Parliament square, as the new, separate supreme court building. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that I somehow sneaked this out on Second Reading, because there was, as I said, a voluminous written ministerial statement about it. Never mind, but that statement would probably answer many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman put to me today.
	The advantage of this particular site—I have advocated it throughout as the most obvious choice—is, of course, its prime constitutional location in Parliament square, with legislature, Executive, the Church and now the judiciary to be represented on all four sides. Furthermore, that location would represent a potentially vast improvement on the cramped conditions of the present accommodation in the House of Lords. Middlesex guildhall is already owned by the Department for Constitutional Affairs and is used as a Crown court.
	I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, who quoted the concerns of Lord Bingham, but they relate to the building that is used now. I believe that it is perfectly possible to strike the right balance between preservation of the key features—we would need planning permissions elsewhere, which is one of the reasons why the Middlesex guildhall remains our preferred location at this stage—and the more traditional approaches of the Law Lords who prefer to sit in panel and have a more open and transparent method of conducting their hearings. I believe that Middlesex guildhall can be refurbished and changed to meet those concerns. I also believe that that location will provide good value for money, in being a refurbishment rather than a new building. It also has the architecture most likely to galvanise widespread recognition and respect among the general public. We know that it also has the support of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs.
	The costs of fitting out and refurbishing the building are on the record. They are significant, but modest in comparison with the costs incurred by some of the big institutional building projects that have taken place already this century. The total of £30 million covers fees, value added tax and a 50 per cent. optimism bias. Also, £15 million will be spent to provide additional Crown court rooms elsewhere in London. We have not announced where those will be, but the options will be reviewed over the next few weeks. Some of London's Crown courts have rooms that are under used, and Middlesex guildhall may not always be the most appropriate place for Crown court hearings, given its wide catchment area and the fact that there might be more suitable locations elsewhere.
	We announced in a written ministerial statement that we had looked at various different options, including Somerset house. Our preferred option, the Middlesex guildhall, was chosen according to the statement of requirements agreed with Lord Bingham. We considered it suitable because of its location, and on the ground of value for money. Developing and refurbishing court houses, including listed buildings, is already part of the Department's core work. We have a good track record and we work on such schemes around the country every day.
	Amendment No. 350 would force the supreme court to remain in the Palace of Westminster. Various Law Lords have complained over the years that this building is too cramped. Middlesex guildhall would offer much more space, with better rooms for hearings as well as better libraries and office accommodation. Those facilities will help the supreme court's very important judges make correct decisions.
	If we retained the supreme court in the Palace of Westminster, there would be no benefit arising from a visible separation between it and the legislature, and such an arrangement would invite questions about the separation, free from parliamentary interference, of funding, facilities and governance arrangements. I hope that the creation of the new supreme court will ensure that separation and transparency.
	Many of the amendments deal with the title "Supreme Court Justice". The hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that his aspiration was to be the Conservatives' conservative and ensure the retention of the title of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. Most people find that title confusing and anachronistic. The title of Supreme Court Justice is far clearer and more accessible. The title of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary was coined in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876. In addition, the phrase "in Ordinary" derives from ecclesiastical law, which makes things even more confused.

Dominic Grieve: I appreciate that the amendments envisage retaining an appointments procedure, but that mechanism is rendered ponderous by the requirement that there be a president of the supreme court, and a deputy president. At present, the senior among the corporate group of judges is, by convention, the one who presides and undertakes a certain amount of regulatory function. The proposal in the Bill represents quite a change, as we shall discuss at more length in the debate on clause 21 stand part. However, I should be grateful if the Minister would say why the Government have decided formally to appoint a president and a deputy.

David Trimble: I wish to ask a question about terminology, although the Minister may have dealt with it in earlier proceedings on the Bill. The phrase "Supreme Court" in new clause 5 refers to the body that will unfortunately replace the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, but does not refer to the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland, which presumably will require a new name in the same way in which the Supreme Court of England and Wales will require a new name. What will the new name of the Northern Ireland body be?

Annabelle Ewing: Briefly, I have not heard anything in our short debate that obviates the need either for the amendments or for a Division, which I shall still seek. Scots law is entirely separate and is devolved to the Scottish Parliament. We have a new political structure in the United Kingdom, which the Minister may not yet have caught up with. He used the Sewel motion as a purported justification for the clause, but it is a political mechanism, and does not provide any justification for the provisions of the Bill which, as I explained in detail, we are seeking to amend. Fifty-five Sewel motions have been passed since 1999. They represent devolution in reverse and are not to be commended.
	The Minister referred to the treaty of Union, but he has failed on Second Reading and in Committee to address the specific concerns expressed by senior legal figures in Scotland about the compatibility of the Bill's proposals with that treaty. The proposed new system and structure will not be entirely distinct and separate from the administration of justice south of the border, and he did not seek to deal with those specific points at all. I therefore seek to divide the Committee on amendment No. 366.

Jonathan Djanogly: My hon. Friends and I tabled the amendment and new clause with the intention of retaining the ability of any future judges of the supreme court to sit in the other place.
	The usual concerns are raised regarding the independence of the judiciary from the legislature. A convention already exists, however, in relation to the present Law Lords—that they will exclude themselves from debates and voting in circumstances where this is properly left to the remaining Members of the other place. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill's statement in 2000 made clear, the Law Lords will not speak or vote on matters which are strongly party political or which they believe would affect their ability to judge a case involving the matters under discussion. If an issue arises in a case as a result of a comment that a Law Lord has made during a debate, the Law Lord in question will not hear that case. That does not take us outside the general principle that the senior judiciary must be careful not to be seen to prejudice their judicial work through extra-judicial activities, an example being the giving of opinions in lectures.
	The input of the current Law Lords is highly valued in the scrutiny of legislation, particularly in Committee, where they bring their technical experience of interpreting legislation. In addition, they contribute informed criticism on social issues, drawing on their practical experience in the courts. They also help to promote the type of legal reform measures that can sometimes be a low legislative priority for Government.
	All that being the case, there is little weight to the argument that the Law Lords, or if necessary their successors in the supreme court, could not maintain or be seen to maintain their independence in judicial matters, and therefore need to be excluded from the other place. As Lord Hope of Craighead said in Committee in the other place, the most that any perceived imperfections in this area might call for are a Standing Order to formalise the successful present conventions. However, I am afraid that that would play into this Government's mindset of total disregard for our conventions, which have served us well in years gone by and still do so today. I have no doubt that the quality of debate in the other place, particularly on legal issues, will be much reduced as a result of the Bill. That is highly regrettable.
	The hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North pointed out that it is helpful for the Law Lords to sit in on proceedings of the House so that they are kept up to date on the issues. All that will go, on the basis of this Bill. I note the Government's desire for a separation of powers, but ask again what is the real purpose of the measure. As for whether things will be better as a result, I am afraid that I cannot see how that will be the case.

Christopher Leslie: These amendments are consequential on the removal of the requirement that the Lord Chancellor be a member of the House of Lords. That was debated in Standing Committee and agreed yesterday on the Floor of the House.
	As drafted, clause 105 provides in that in the House of Lords only the Lord Chancellor may make a motion for the presentation of an address by Her Majesty to remove a senior judge in Northern Ireland.
	Government amendment No. 3 provides that, where the Lord Chancellor is not a member of the House of Lords, he or she may request another Minister of the Crown to make a motion to that House for the presentation of an address to Her Majesty for the removal of a person from office as a senior judge. Clause 105 also provides that, before making such a motion in the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor shall lay before that House a copy of the removals tribunal's report. Therefore, to make that consequential change, Government amendment No. 4 provides that that could be done by the other Minister making the motion.
	Government amendment No. 16 makes similar consequential amendments to the post-devolution arrangements governing removal from most senior judicial offices in Northern Ireland. Those arrangements are prescribed in section 12B of the Judicature (Northern Ireland) Act 1978, as substituted by section 6 of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002.
	These amendments are essentially consequential on yesterday's decision by the Committee to remove clause 2 of the Bill.

Patrick Cormack: The Minister rightly says that these amendments are consequential on yesterday's decision by the Committee, but he will concede that the Bill must return to the other place after our deliberations here. There will therefore be further opportunity for their lordships to reflect on what has been said in this House, and to pronounce upon it. If the other place reinserts clause 2, or something similar, and requires the Lord Chancellor to be a Member of the House of Lords, I hope that the Government will not insist on their proposals.
	It is highly unlikely that we will have to wait until 2006 for a general election, but even so the Parliament Act cannot be invoked for this Bill, as it began in the House of Lords. The Government are likely to get mostly of what they want, even though the Bill, when it was first presented, was very rough. I therefore hope that they will not reject any insistence by the other place that the Lord Chancellor should be a Member of the House of Lords.
	I should be grateful to hear what the Minister has to say about that.

Dominic Grieve: I see the Minister is nodding, so he will doubtless be able to provide me with complete reassurance, but I find the wording of proposed new subsection (3) slightly surprising in those circumstances because it appears to exclude that possibility even if that may not be its intention. I should be grateful to the Minister if he dealt with that.
	As for the rest of the amendments, the Minister will be aware why we wish to preserve the office of Lord Chancellor, but I fully accept that such amendments are necessary, as that office will disappear at the end of the process. Doubtless, if the other place decides to reverse the amendments that the Government have tabled here, the Minister will have to reconsider the matter.

Christopher Leslie: The hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) said that he regretted decisions that we took earlier in Committee and postulated the hypothetical scenario in asking what would happen if the other place were to reintroduce clause 2 on the requirement for the Lord Chancellor to be a Member of the House of Lords and, if it were to do so, whether we would have to reverse these consequential changes. He will not be surprised to hear me say that, as with most hypothetical scenarios, that is entirely hypothetical and it would be premature for me to suppose that that will be the consequence of the other place's deliberations on our amendments, which we made with good grounds and a strong majority opinion in the House. I hope that the other House would respect the view of the elected Chamber on that matter, so it is not unreasonable that we have introduced these consequential Government amendments, which could allow someone other than the Lord Chancellor, if the post holder sits in the Commons, to move motions for the removal of judges in the other place.
	The hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) asked a wider question that seemed to suggest that we were broadening the debate from simply discussing these Government amendments. The definition of good behaviour in clause 105 is not technically touched on by these Government amendments, but I am happy—if it is in order, Mrs. Heal—to answer his points since it appears that we may be having a substantive debate at this stage. He asked about the definition of good behaviour, good conduct and so forth. I am sure that he has more historical knowledge about the origin of many of those phrases. I gather that, around the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688, there was a change from judges holding their offices at the King's pleasure to them doing so during good behaviour. I do not think that the phrase "good behaviour" is defined elsewhere in statute, but it is commonly understood. For example, the last judge who was removed for misbehaviour was apparently a circuit judge who was convicted of smuggling, although I am not sure when that happened. A clear breach of the judicial oath would fall under that category, but decisions must be based on each specific case.

Christopher Leslie: It might have been appropriate to table an amendment on the matter, but I do not think that the inconsistency or contradiction that the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) presupposes exists.
	The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked whether any Member could move a motion for the removal of judges, but I remind him that we are debating the amendments in the context of clause 105, which relates specifically to Northern Ireland. A feature of the settlement in Northern Ireland means that the measure will exclude Members from having the right to move an address in relation to judges in Northern Ireland, but we are not introducing such a provision for judges in England and Wales. It will still be open to any Member to move a motion regarding such judges in theory, but if a motion were moved on behalf of the Executive, that would clearly be the responsibility of specific Ministers in circumstances described elsewhere in the Bill.

William Cash: I am sorry to be so persistent on this point. As my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) suggested, perhaps an exchange of letters would be the simplest way to deal with the problem. I refer the Minister, as a starting point, to page 372 of the important tome "Bradley & Ewing", which sets out the issues clearly. It says:
	"assuming that there was no intention to alter the effect of the Act of Settlement by the revised wording now contained in the Supreme Court Act 1981, it is theoretically possible for a judge to be dismissed not only for misconduct, but for any other reason which might induce both Houses to pass the necessary address to the Crown".
	I am especially interested in the words
	"but for any other reason"
	because there is not a question simply of misconduct. These are weighty matters and, if I may say so, this is an example of the deep waters into which we are getting. The Bill is setting out provisions in statute that have been covered by profound constitutional arrangements that have developed over centuries. It does not follow that every single thing that has been done in the past was right, but the Bill is not being handled in the correct way.

Paul Tyler: I only want to intervene briefly to say that the obverse could reply. If the tribunal has made that recommendation, it would be a peculiar decision by any member of the Executive, whether Prime Minister or Lord Chancellor, to go against the advice. That is properly a matter for a subsequent clause, however.

David Trimble: I think that the Minister is, uncharacteristically, in error. What we are discussing is in no way related to the current suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly. If it resumed tomorrow, the provisions in the 2002 Act would not apply. They are not part of the settlement to which the Minister refers, but they are part of an entirely separate arrangement about the possible future devolution of justice and policing matters to the Northern Ireland Assembly. That will not happen without the agreement of both sides of the community in Northern Ireland, and at present there is absolutely no prospect of that happening in the foreseeable future. We have turned our face very firmly against it. In that situation, to introduce measures that would only come into effect in the distant future is a retrograde step, and to pass this off as following on from the 1998 agreement is not right.

Ross Cranston: I did not rise to the bait in respect of clause 106, but I do want to contribute to this debate. As the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) said, these are deep waters, but I hope that their very depth will protect me to some extent.
	I want to make three points, but first I should declare an interest. I am a member of the Bar of Northern Ireland and also hold the rank of Queen's Counsel there. I have never practised in Northern Ireland and the rank that I hold is not an indication of my merit, as it followed automatically when I became Solicitor-General in 1998.
	When I visited Northern Ireland as Solicitor-General, I was struck by the quality of the judiciary there. For judges, the situation was very difficult and they were under protection all the time. The fact that the Bench was drawn from the whole community in Northern Ireland impressed me, as did the way in which the judiciary handled emergency cases. Although there was no jury in those cases, judges were both conscientious and careful.
	My first point is that clause 106, and the equivalent provisions in the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, as amended, will never be invoked in practice. Only in very exceptional cases will a member of the lower judiciary in Northern Ireland be found guilty of the misbehaviour that will cause these provisions to be applied.
	My second point has to do with the substantive provisions in the clause, and it is that very high barriers are in place in respect of the removal of a judge. A tribunal has to be convened and, although I do not want to stray too far into the territory covered by clause 107, the composition of that tribunal is set out in clause 107(5). That subsection provides that the exclusive membership of the tribunal must "consist of" the Lord Chief Justice or a Lord Justice of Appeal in Northern Ireland, a judge of Northern Ireland High Court, and a lay person. I think that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), in his earlier remarks, may have made an error in that regard.
	The tribunal is therefore extremely powerful, and the first hurdle that must be negotiated is that there must be a tribunal decision.

Dominic Grieve: If the hon. and learned Gentleman is correct in his reading of clause 107, I am reassured. However, he used the word "exclusively", where I saw in the Bill only the word "consist". That is why I suggested that the tribunal had to consist of those members specified, but that it could also consist of other members.

Ross Cranston: No, it means that someone must listen seriously. I accept that it does not mean that someone must do as they are told; but it means that someone must do what their consultees have told them.
	I disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Tony Wright), one of my neighbours in the west midlands, who spoke about the logic that would lead to people who sit as recorders—as I do and as at least one Opposition Member does—being excluded from the House. On the subject of logic, if one starts from the wrong premise and follows it logically, one may end up in hell. In this country, our constitutional arrangements do not work logically; they work pragmatically and we proceed incrementally. Sometimes that means that the arrangements may be muddled or inconsistent, as in this case, between jurisdictions, but that is the nature of our constitution. I can see that, logically, the amendment might have a certain attraction, but as a matter of pragmatic incrementalism, which is what our constitution is based on, it is not appealing.

David Trimble: I listened with great interest to the contribution of the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston), although I am not sure that his intervention during the last speech was entirely accurate. He may want to look at that provision again. What particularly interested me in his original contribution was his comment that we worked pragmatically rather than simply following logic wherever it might lead. That struck me as a reworking of the famous dictum of Oliver Wendell Holmes, and I endorse it entirely. It is of course part of the reason why I do not like the whole Bill. The whole Bill stems from a rather jejune attitude to the separation of powers, rather than respecting the way in which our traditions have actually evolved, but that is a broader matter.
	I agree entirely with the comments of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and would like to add to them that examining the legislative history of the provision that is now clause 106 (5) would be worth while. One turns to the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, where the equivalent provision is section 7(5), which, as enacted, reads that a person holding a listed judicial office
	"may not be removed or suspended without the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice".
	The Act was clear that it had to be the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, rather than consultation. The lowering of the procedural hurdle occurred in the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2004, on whose Bill Committee I had, unfortunately, to sit—but that is another matter. The phrase "without the agreement of" was deleted from clause 5 and the phrase "except after consultation with" was inserted.
	We disapproved heartily of the 2004 Act. We did not consider that the change was made on its merits; it was made simply because it was one of a number of items on the Social Democratic and Labour party shopping list. The SDLP wanted to prove that it was more effective than Sinn Fein and that it could bully the Government into making changes in the law to suit the SDLP rather than the changes the Government considered appropriate or advisable. For their own reasons, the Government decided to give way to that pressure and amended that Bill.
	As I said previously, the 2002 Act is not in force and will not be in force even if devolution is resumed in Northern Ireland. The Act will come into force only after resumption and a subsequent decision by the Northern Ireland Assembly on a cross-community vote to agree to the devolution of justice and policing matters, which is, as I said to the Minister, not going to happen. It is not going to happen because my party will not agree to it, and I believe that the Democratic Unionist party would adopt the same position. It will require considerable changes that do not seem likely to happen before we would agree to the devolution of policing and justice matters.
	This is not a temporary arrangement that will operate in six months or a year, when policing and justice matters are devolved. This is something for some way in the future, so why it has been brought into the present? It is not a matter of any agreement between the parties—there never was any agreement between them before the 2004 Act or the 2002 Act—and it is not in any way part of any settlement. Crucially, when the Government first looked at the issue, they decided—their decision is embodied in the 2002 Act—that these procedures should operate only with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice, which is more than just consultation.
	On this matter, the Government's first thoughts, which were their own thoughts, were better than what they decided to do as part of a squalid political deal with the SDLP at a later date. For that reason, I urge the Government to accept the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. At the very least, they should go back and take a good, hard look at the issue and explain to us why they have introduced these provisions, which will not go live in Northern Ireland—at least the rest of the 2002 Act provisions will not go live—and the Minister will need to assure us that there is a reason for introducing them and that no untoward political influence of the sort that resulted in the 2004 Act is behind them.

Edward Garnier: I think that these late nights are getting to the young man, but I shall continue.
	The amendment is perfectly sensible. Surely, if the Government are so keen as they tell us they are to ensure the separation between the Executive, Parliament and the judiciary, it must be perfectly proper for the Lord Chief Justice to be required to agree with any disciplinary activities that the Bill intends. If the separation of powers is to be a properly respected concept, the senior judge in Northern Ireland must agree to the removal or suspension of a judge in Northern Ireland. After all, that is only the reverse of the picture that the Government wish to paint in this jurisdiction. Clause 94(2)—we will consider the clause in greater detail in due course—says that the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales
	"may exercise any of the following powers but only with the agreement of the Minister".
	If there is to be agreement one way, why should there not be agreement the other way in the other jurisdiction?
	That is a minor matter compared with the question of removal. The Lord Chief Justice must get the agreement of the Minister—the Lord Chancellor, as we now know that he will be called—if he wants to give advice, a warning or a formal reprimand to a judge in this jurisdiction. However, the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland cannot do any of those things because only the Lord Chancellor can do that, after merely consulting the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.
	Clause 94(5) states that the Lord Chief Justice may suspend an English judge for any period if
	"the person has been convicted of a criminal offence, . . . it has been determined under prescribed procedures that the person should not be removed from office, and . . . it appears to the Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of the Minister that the suspension is necessary for maintaining confidence in the judiciary."
	What is good for one jurisdiction should be good for the other.
	I was not impressed by the attractively-put argument of the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North that this is a funny old world and we have a funny old constitution, so we tinker about with it in a funny old way. The Government are knocking the constitution to bits on the back of an envelope. When we get to a Bill, we should at least do things properly.

William Cash: I will indeed, Sir Alan. If the amendment were accepted, a judge could not be removed or suspended without with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. In its existing form, clause 106(5) says that he cannot
	"be removed or suspended except after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice."
	It would defy my understanding of the rules of debate if I were not allowed to argue that the question of removal or suspension should include reference to clause 106(3). In conclusion, the words "neglect of duty" have been omitted from that subsection, although the draftsman included the words
	"misbehaviour or inability to perform the functions".
	That mirrors precisely the Scottish provision. The omission of "neglect of duty" must therefore be deliberate, and I should be grateful if the Minister explained why.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. and learned Friend is right. I infer, I think correctly, that their desire to draft the Bill in this way has nothing to do with any objective analysis of whether this is the best system to impose on the people of Northern Ireland, or with protecting their interests. They did it because they fettered themselves, as they see it, in the past by setting up structures that may or may not be appropriate for a devolved structure of Government, but certainly are not for as long as power is retained at Westminster. Then they say to the House, "You can't tinker with it."
	I completely disagree with the Minister about this. It would be much better if any removal or suspension had to take place with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. Furthermore, it is wrong that this House should be deprived of the opportunity to table a motion for the removal of a judge from office. On that basis, we are being completely consistent. For those reasons, Sir Alan, I wish to press the amendment to the vote.

Christopher Leslie: These are mainly drafting amendments, but the provisions that they amend are important.
	Clause 94 puts the judicial disciplinary system for England and Wales on a statutory basis for the first time. The judicial disciplinary system will involve the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice working together. The Lord Chancellor will have the power to remove judicial office-holders below the level of the High Court, with the agreement of the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice will have power to give formal advice, warnings or reprimands to judicial office-holders as a result of the disciplinary process, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor.
	The provisions faithfully reflect the concordat agreed with the judiciary. They build on the judicial disciplinary system that already exists, but involve the Lord Chief Justice more fully in decisions to reflect the fact that he will henceforth be the head of the judiciary in England and Wales. The Lord Chancellor's continuing role in disciplinary matters reflects the need for a Minister to be accountable to Parliament, and a representative of the public interest. The more detailed framework of the disciplinary process will be contained in regulations made by the Lord Chief Justice, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, under clause 96. The regulations will be subject to the negative procedure in Parliament.
	The Lord Chief Justice also has power, under clause 98, to make subordinate rules, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, which must be published but are not subject to parliamentary approval. That is because we envisage that the rules will contain a lot of detail on how complaints and disciplinary procedures will work, and they may need to be revised and reissued fairly frequently.
	Government amendment No. 11 removes a possible problem arising from the drafting of clause 94 by making it clear that subsection (2), which states that the Lord Chief Justice may exercise his disciplinary power
	"only with the agreement of the Minister"
	and in accordance with "prescribed procedures", does not affect what he may do informally. That ensures that the existing arrangements for informal guidance and counselling can continue within the new framework.
	Government Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 correct references to "disciplinary procedures" by replacing them with references to "prescribed procedures". Disciplinary procedures will be prescribed by the Lord Chief Justice under clauses 96 and 98. The former clause allows him to make regulations with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, and subject to Parliament's negative procedure; the latter clause allows him to make rules with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor.
	Government Amendment No. 14 clarifies the effect of suspending a judge. Clause 94 allows the Lord Chief Justice, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, to suspend a judge in certain circumstances when that judge is subject to disciplinary procedures. The amendment makes it clear that a judge who is suspended may not exercise the functions of his office, but that his other rights—concerning pay and pension, for example—are unaffected.
	Government Amendment No. 15 makes it clear that disciplinary regulations made by the Lord Chief Justice will define when someone is subject to prescribed procedures or is under investigation for an offence. That will govern the exercise of the new power in clause 94(7), which allows the Lord Chief Justice, with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, to suspend a judicial office holder in those circumstances.
	These amendments are tidying-up amendments, but they also relate to the important issues with which clauses 94 and 95 deal. I therefore urge the Committee to support them.

Keith Vaz: I want to speak briefly about this issue now because it is possible that the various remaining amendments will be dealt with quite quickly. That shows that the Government were right to give the Committee of the whole House the opportunity to debate the Bill over two full days. The Government were also right to table these particular amendments, because it is important that an informal procedure be put in place that allows the Lord Chief Justice to speak directly to a judge who might be the subject of disciplinary procedures. Obviously, clear procedures also have to be in place, and I am glad that the regulations to be produced by the Lord Chief Justice will be the subject of consultation. I am not clear—I hope that the Minister will tell us in his reply—whether that means consultation with the Lord Chancellor. I hope that the wider judiciary will be consulted. If we want a fair system that enables judges to be treated with respect and dignity, it is important to consult the judiciary as widely as possible.
	At some stage, I hope that we can also deal with the broader issue of the training of judges. It is important to give them the widest possible training on a wide range of issues. The provisions that we are debating now deal specifically with the incidents mentioned in clause 94(1), (2) and (3). I want us to reflect on the wider issues and ensure that, when judges are appointed, they are acquainted with the reasons why they might be disciplined. The clause allows the disciplinary procedures to be put into effect and the amendments would allow the informal procedures to take place, which is very important, but it does not detract from importance of being absolutely clear about why a judge is being subject to any of these proceedings.

Christopher Leslie: First, my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) was concerned about the details of the rules governing disciplinary proceedings and the processes that must be followed. He said that there must be ample consultation, and I assure him that the rules require the agreement of the Lord Chancellor and that they must be published. In many ways, the further enshrinement of the rules' particularities is useful, not only for the members of the judiciary who may be subject to them but for raising the confidence of the wider public.
	The right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) is one of those Conservative Members who have said that we should not categorise rigidly all relevant rules and decisions. That is why we tabled an amendment to ensure that the Lord Chief Justice's more informal activities will not be constrained. Our aim is to strike the right balance. If legislation is insufficiently specific, we get criticised for leaving gaping holes, whereas we get criticised for being rigidly constraining if we put too much detail in. I hope that we have managed to strike the balance well and that we have achieved broad consensus on the disciplinary arrangements.
	As for the question raised by the hon. Member for Stone on his current favourite subject—good behaviour as opposed to misbehaviour—we have not changed the principles that are to be followed. The Bill does not alter arrangements for the test for removal from office, for example. The present arrangements will continue. If the hon. Gentleman wants to continue our discussion, I would happy to correspond with him on the issue. I hope that the amendments will receive the support of the Committee.
	Amendment agreed to.
	Amendments made: No. 12, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert
	'prescribed procedures in relation to the conduct constituting the offence.'.
	No. 13, in page 41, line 28, leave out 'disciplinary' and insert 'prescribed'.
	No. 14, in page 41, line 29, leave out subsection (8) and insert—
	'(8)   While a person is suspended under this section from any office he may not perform any of the functions of the office (but his other rights as holder of the office are not affected).'.
	No. 24, in page 41, line 20, leave out 'Minister' and insert 'Lord Chancellor'.—[Mr. Leslie.]
	Clause 94, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Amendment made: No. 15, in clause 95, page 42, line 14, leave out subsection (7) and insert—
	'(7)   The times when a person becomes and ceases to be subject to prescribed procedures for the purposes of section 94(4) or (7) are such as may be prescribed.
	(8)   "Under investigation for an offence" has such meaning as may be prescribed.'.
	—[Mr. Leslie.]
	Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: It could be argued that somebody is serving a sentence if they are paying off a substantial fine in monthly instalments. For that reason, I should be grateful if the Minister would write to me on that point. There may be a good reason for the strange comment that sentence does not include a fine, but looking at the rest of the clause, I am a loss to understand what it is. If the Minister could reassure me on that point, I should be most grateful.

John Horam: I appreciate your point entirely, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I thought that that was a possible way to demonstrate—however briefly and subject to your censure—that about half of Bromley's acreage is taken up by green belt and that about two thirds or three quarters of Orpington is green belt. Green belt is very important to my constituents.
	As the Minister knows, the green belt has been protected from development ever since it was first created in the 1950s, and that remains essential because it is the only bulwark against development and the despoliation of the environment. One of the major reasons why people want to live in Orpington and Bromley is precisely their greenness. "Clean and Green" is the borough of Bromley's slogan and not without reasons. We have in the green belt a world heritage site—Darwin's home, Down house—and the Minister will also be interested to know that Richmal Crompton, the novelist, wrote about "Just William" and "William and the Outlaw" precisely in the sort of green belt area that I am talking about. It is an area with major bluebell woods and orchards and it is much valued by my constituents. However, that green belt is under threat and has been considerably damaged already.
	The immediate threat comes from Irish Travellers. The official figures from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister show that there were 38 authorised pitches and 60 unauthorised pitches for Travellers in the borough of Bromley at the last count on 19 July 2004. The Government's official figures also show that Bromley had more authorised and unauthorised pitches than any other borough in London—98 in total. Southwark was next with 66 pitches. Bromley has already made considerable provision for Travellers. Indeed, those official figures—they are, of course, about eight months out of date—underestimate the situation, which is developing. Current estimates suggest that there are probably 60 unauthorised pitches on the Waldens farm site alone.
	All of the unauthorised pitches are in the green belt, the effect of which can be seen in some of the photographs with which I have not plagued the House. I realise that you would rule them out of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I have given them to the Minister. In that little selection of photographs, she will see the before and after situation, with four years intervening, in an area known as Layhams road, which vividly illustrates the effect. In the first instance, there is a clear, open field. Four years later, when Bromley council had lost a High Court case, the area is filled with caravans, roads and fences. Indeed, that is precisely what happens.
	Caravans are moved in, tipping begins, and at £150 a truckload considerable profit can be made from allowing refuse to be tipped on a site without anyone paying any rates or rent of any kind. Hardcore is then put down and fencing is put up. New entrances are made on to the road with large diggers. Fences are torn up. Rubbish and detritus of all sorts accumulate because there is of course no refuse collection.
	The desolation of the environment is bad enough, but intimidation also occurs. People who live in the area find that some, although certainly not all, of the Travellers practise intimidatory behaviour. I am afraid that criminality has also crept in. It is no accident that burglary has increased in the immediate area around Waldens farm. Every house but one has been burgled in the past two years, and whenever police have raided the Irish Travellers' site at Waldens farm stolen goods have been recovered in fairly large quantities.
	One must remember that Waldens farm was a Kentish orchard. Allotments were situated on the site and people went there to walk and generally to enjoy the countryside. It was a place for pleasure, but it is now an intimidating area that is heavily dug up. New caravan sites are appearing there all the time. My constituents' first worry is simply the desolation of the environment and the intimidation that goes with it.
	This is not happening to a community with little experience of Travellers. There is a long history of Traveller activity on the borders of London and Kent, so the local community is experienced at dealing with Travellers. Many Travellers have settled down in the area and rented or bought homes, and there are 38 authorised pitches on two sites at Star lane and Old Maidstone road, which are well settled. Relationships between the English Travellers, who have been there for many years, and local residents are not at all bad. Indeed, the community probably has the largest number of settled Travellers in London, and perhaps even the United Kingdom, which explains why the local community is able to handle the English Travellers who have lived there for many years. If such a community is worried about what is happening, we have real cause for concern.
	The new element that has come about in the past three or so years is the Irish Travellers, who have moved in with some force. For example, the council notes that most of the registration numbers on the cars, caravans and trucks are from the west of Ireland. What information does the Minister have about the influx of Irish Travellers? What talks have been held between the Irish Government and her Department on how large the problem has become? My information shows that the problem has occurred because the laws in Ireland on trespass and parking in unauthorised places have been tightened up. We in south-east London are clearly suffering the consequences of the Irish Government's measures, and residents think that that is unfair. It is the Government's job to protect their citizens, but they are not doing their job if they have not explored the Irish element of the problem as well as the English element.
	The Irish Travellers usually move in at the weekend when council offices are closed and the establishment of their sites—the building of fences and laying down of paths and ways in—is less likely to be disturbed. They then apply for retrospective planning permission, which the council usually refuses, so they then appeal. On appeal, the Travellers' case is usually handled by experienced barristers—indeed, I understand that a Birmingham law practice specialises in such cases. The appeals are often funded by legal aid. Although the Minister might know more about this than me because she was once a Minister in the Lord Chancellor's Department, I believe that the Department for Constitutional Affairs has a fund to finance such appeals by Travellers. They appeal under human rights legislation, and because the appeal process currently takes a long time to complete—because of the logjam in the system with which the inspectors must deal due to changes to legislation—it can take nine months from the beginning of an appeal to its end. The whole process drags on and years, rather than months, pass by during which nothing seems to be resolved.
	The despoliation of the green belt is my constituents first concern, but their second is the absolute unfairness of the situation. It appears that there is one law for the citizen and another for the Traveller. A constituent whose family have lived in the area for three generations and who has a small farm is being denied permission to extend his farming activities by the local council. The council's decision is correct, or at least understandable, because the land is in the green belt and the extension of activity would be observable from one or two local houses. Twenty-two jobs are at stake on the farm. My constituent is extremely concerned that he is not to be allowed to proceed even though he has gone through the procedures properly, whereas Travellers are doing business nearby and simply ignoring the law. Similarly, a farmer whose farm is close to Waldens farm and who is trying to renew his old barn is not being allowed to do so: under the planning rules, the council has to turn him down because green-belt land is involved. On the one hand, the Travellers simply ignore all the planning laws; on the other, people who have lived in the area for a long time and who observe the law are turned down. I am sure that the Minister can understand their sense of indignation and outrage at the lack of fair play.
	My constituents also feel completely powerless. It seems that they cannot do anything about what is happening. The council fights, but is unable to do anything. The Government appear to be ignoring the situation. My constituents are in an extremely difficult position and I pay tribute to them for the remarkable patience that they have shown. They have organised and held public meetings, which I have attended. The meetings were packed with people determined to show that they will fight to defend the green belt, but they want to stay within the law and behave properly. They have formed a co-ordinating committee to liaise with the council and they have put considerable pressure on the council. Local residents around Layhams road—another of the sites with which I have had to deal—are doing the same. They are showing great responsibility and patience, but that patience is not endless. The fact is that they are not getting the support that they really need as law-abiding citizens and long-standing residents of the area.
	The council has responded to the residents' understandable concern. Following my presentation of a 1,000-signature petition, council leader Stephen Carr agreed to give the issue high priority, and I believe that he has stuck by that resolution. I also single out Mr. Bob McQuillan, the chief development control officer, for the part that he has played. He has gained local residents' respect for his common-sense approach and his tireless efforts to deal with the problem.
	The council has shown a considerable degree of intelligence in its approach. Precisely because going through the planning route takes so long—years—and because the process is so expensive for the council, especially the cost of appeals, the council has applied for an injunction in the case of Waldens farm. Fortunately, last summer the judge came down on the side of the council and made it plain that the Irish Travellers were breaking the law. They were not abiding by planning law and were therefore in the wrong. The judge gave the council the right to remove caravans if it could be proved that they had arrived after 1 July last year, when the hearing was held, and as a result of that ruling three caravans were removed. However, the case illustrates the slowness of the process because 60 caravans remain. The council will now have to go through the lengthy and costly procedure again to try to get rid of the rest.
	That is the situation on the ground, but it is not close to resolution. The Government have been extremely slow to deal with the problem. Their first effort consisted of a proposal to introduce temporary stop notices on 29 November. Frankly, they are useless and, although I am not certain that the Government have conceded the point, it is apparent to practitioners in the field that those notices are simply ignored by Travellers, just as other planning restrictions are ignored. The proposal to introduce notices has been the main reaction from the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, but it is quite inadequate. It was clear to the Prime Minister that the Department was failing to grasp the issue, because at Prime Minister's Question Time on 15 December, shortly after the temporary stop notice consultation began, he told my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mr. Baron):
	"The question is whether the new power of local authorities to get a stop notice quickly and to implement it quickly will be sufficient, or whether we have to take the further steps that the hon. Gentleman suggested."—[Official Report, 15 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 1668.]
	That has proved to be the case, because shortly after, on 21 December, a new consultation document was produced, literally two weeks after the first consultation on temporary stop notices began. Events have therefore moved on, and it is obvious that the Prime Minister's office decided that the ODPM was not doing its job. The Times quoted a Government source as saying:
	"There is an ODPM versus Blair and Milburn split."
	It is not unusual to hear of that split but, whatever happened, I welcome the Government's change of tune. The new consultation documentation is more comprehensive than the original one, which simply dealt with temporary stop notices.
	The consultation period ends on 19 March. The consultation document produced by the Government does not say anything about increased powers for local authorities to deal with breaches of planning law. If an overall package is to work, it must include increased powers for local authorities, so that once the number of sites has been settled they can deal with the unauthorised sites that might otherwise accumulate. Without such a measure, the situation will remain unstable and the present unsatisfactory arrangements will persist. That is the first thing that is wrong with the consultation document—it simply does not talk about increased powers for local authorities.
	The document focuses on local authorities providing sites, but it does not say anything about providing a cap once reasonable provision has been achieved. Councils will not know whether they have done enough, and neither will residents. A council might try to meet the problem, but it will not receive a guarantee from the Government that thereafter it can take a tougher line with people who break the law. Moreover, the document talks about housing need being determined by regional housing boards. I imagine that that will not be the case in London, as we have a Mayor. The views of regional housing boards on housing will not pertain in the metropolitan area, and the matter will be decided according to the London plan and the views of the Mayor. Whoever decides the matter, it will not be decided by the elected representatives of the people of Bromley. It will be decided by another body, whether the elected Mayor or the unelected bureaucrats of the regional housing board. They, not local people, will decide how many sites are to be provided in Orpington and Bromley.
	The consultation document talks about Travellers settling down, as they have done in Orpington over the years, on permanent sites. If that is allowed to happen, there will be a permanent residential development of the green belt. We are no longer talking about temporary sites for Travellers on the move but residential development within the green belt. If that is permitted to Travellers, it should be allowed to other people, and if others are stopped, so should Travellers be. Again, it is a matter of fairness.
	There is no real discussion of the issue of English and Irish Travellers. As I indicated, it appears that the traditional situation that pertained in an area such as Orpington, which is long established and has worked reasonably satisfactorily, has been disrupted by the influx over the past three or four years, for reasons about which I can only speculate, but which I am tempted to set out to the Minister. There is no discussion of that.
	It being Seven o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.
	Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Paul Clark.]

Yvette Cooper: Let me explain our approach to the revision of circular 1/94. As I said, we are consulting on the matter because it was becoming clear that the circular was not working effectively. It allowed local authorities to set criteria for the sites for which planning permission might be granted to Gypsies and Travellers. However, in many areas, the criteria were so tightly drawn that it was inconceivable that any plot of land in the local authority area would fulfil them. Sites were therefore impossible to identify in practice.
	The new consultation circular says that local authorities need to undertake a proper assessment of need and that the regional spatial strategies need to establish the level of sites needed. The reason for involving the regional planning bodies is that, in some areas, one local authority might have a great deal of provision while a neighbouring one might have very little. The latter authority could effectively be free-riding on the provision next door, making life more difficult for the authority that is providing a lot of sites compared with other areas. The issue therefore needs to be considered at regional level, and the regional spatial strategies need to be used to assess the level of provision required.
	Local authorities' spatial planning policies must also address these issues, identify specific sites and set out achievable policy criteria that offer a chance that planning permission will be granted, rather than making that impossible because of the way in which they define those criteria. Local authorities will be obliged to identify sites according to need, and it is up to those authorities to draw up the plans. If they do not do so, there is a process whereby the regional planning body can get involved and, ultimately, for planning inspectors to consider the plans and ensure that they meet the need identified in the area. Local authorities will have the strongest role to play in this regard.
	We cannot get away from the fact that, if enforcement powers are to be effective, we need not only to be able to move people off inappropriate sites but to be able to identify appropriate sites for them to go to. We must recognise that this is not an easy process, but we cannot walk away from the problem.

Yvette Cooper: As I said, the information that my officials have does not tally with the hon. Gentleman's suggestions about Travellers from Ireland. I think that the decline of site provision, particularly in certain areas, is a issue. Changes were made in 1994, when the old duty on local authorities was in place and since then there has been a decline in the number of publicly provided pitches. As I also said, I think we have seen little change in the overall number of unauthorised encampments, whereas there has been a change in the number of unauthorised developments where Gypsies and Travellers are choosing to buy their own property to develop on it without planning permission.
	We will pull together all the work done as part of the review, in regard to both the temporary stop notice and the revised planning circular. We are also considering other possibilities, including funding through regional housing boards and registered social landlords for site provision in particular areas.
	The hon. Gentleman asked whether a meeting would be possible. As my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister has said, it would be inappropriate for Ministers to meet to discuss individual planning cases. I think that that extends to delegations of people who are themselves involved in individual planning cases and may have lodged objections, thus being participants in an ongoing planning process. I am, however, happy to meet the hon. Gentleman, as I have met a series of hon. Members from all parties, to discuss policies and principles. As he will understand, we shall need to be clear about the matters that we cannot discuss, but I think it would be too difficult, and inappropriate, to meet people involved in objections and campaigns relating to specific cases. That would raise the question of whether Ministers, to show that they were being fair, should meet delegations from other groups. We have ways of ensuring that Ministers do not comment on or discuss individual planning cases, while being seen to be fair. But, as I have said, I shall be happy to discuss further with the hon. Gentleman such issues as temporary stop notices and the revision of circular 1/94.
	These are complex and difficult issues, but we must face them. It would be irresponsible of us not to do so and not to recognise the need to solve the problems of both site provision and enforcement to achieve a better outcome for not just local residential communities but Gypsies and Travellers.
	Question put and agreed to.
	Adjourned accordingly at twenty-nine minutes past Seven o'clock.